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STILL KICKIN’ AFTER ALL THESE YEARS:  
SUTTON AND TOYOTA AS SHADOW 
PRECEDENTS 
Deborah A. Widiss* 
ABSTRACT 
In the first 10 years following the enactment of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the Supreme Court interpreted the Act as setting 
a very high threshold for what kinds of conditions qualified as disabilities, and for 
what had to be shown to establish that an individual was discriminated against 
because he or she was “regarded as” having a disability. These decisions were 
superseded by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). The ADAAA 
characterized the Court’s interpretations as counter to congressional intent and 
added substantive language that specifically rejects numerous aspects of the 
Court’s opinions. Despite the clarity of this override, this symposium contribution 
shows some courts continue to follow portions of the decisions that were clearly 
superseded.  
In a series of articles, I have demonstrated that courts often continue to rely 
on overridden precedents—or what I have called shadow precedents. My earlier 
work explores instances in which it was unclear or debatable whether the override 
or the prior precedent should control. This article, by contrast, highlights 
examples of ongoing reliance on shadow precedents where it is unquestionably 
improper. In numerous post-ADAAA cases, courts follow the superseded 
precedents without mentioning the amendments at all, or they misunderstand the 
clear language of the override. These mistakes are particularly prevalent in courts’ 
interpretation of the plaintiff’s burden in “regarded as” claims; courts continue to 
apply the old, explicitly repudiated standard rather than the standard adopted in 
the ADAAA. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 I. Sutton, Toyota, and the ADA Amendments Act .............................. 922 
 II. Citation Patterns After the Override .................................................. 928 
 III. Research Method .................................................................................. 930 
 
 * Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I am grateful to Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig for organizing this symposium on the 25th anniversary of the ADA for 
the Association of American Law Schools’ annual conference and inviting me to 
participate in it, and also to the Drake Law Review for offering to publish the symposium 
papers. My thanks as well to Steve Befort for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and 
to the editors of the Drake Law Review for their extremely conscientious work.   
  
920 Drake Law Review [Vol. 63 
 
 IV. Sutton and Toyota As Shadow Precedents ......................................... 931 
A. Proper Reliance on Sutton and Toyota ....................................... 931 
B. Arguably Proper Reliance on Sutton and Toyota ...................... 932 
1. Related Statutes ....................................................................... 932 
2. Underlying Reasoning ............................................................. 934 
C. Mistaken Reliance on Sutton and Toyota ................................... 936 
1. Ignoring the ADAAA Entirely .............................................. 938 
2. Acknowledging the ADAAA but Misconstruing It ............ 941 
3. The “Regarded As” Problem ................................................. 942 
 V. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 945 
 
In 2008, the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) was enacted with 
broad bipartisan support—a particularly impressive feat in this era of 
heightened partisan gridlock—and signed by President George W. Bush.1 
Congress announced, in statutory language, that it “rejected” prior Supreme 
Court interpretations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which 
had set an extremely high standard for what kinds of impairments could 
constitute a qualifying disability.2 The ADAAA stated that the courts were 
to construe the ADA’s definition of disability in favor of “broad coverage,” 
so that the ADA could fulfill its intended role of “provid[ing] a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”3 
The ADAAA, like the ADA before it, was properly celebrated as 
landmark legislation.4 But the ADAAA’s impact depends on how courts 
interpret it. In a series of earlier articles, I have explored the extent to which 
courts continue to rely on overridden precedents, or what I have called 
 
 1.  See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187 (2007) (providing detailed discussion 
of the drafting and negotiations involved with the ADAAA); see also Stephen F. Befort, 
An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2029 (2013) [hereinafter Befort, Empirical Examination]. 
 2.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3554 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)) (explicitly rejecting aspects of 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 194 (2002)).   
 3.  Id., § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3553 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1))(internal 
quotations omitted). 
 4.  See, e.g., Befort, Empirical Examination, supra note 1. 
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“shadow precedents.”5 I have shown that courts sometimes continue to 
follow the underlying reasoning of a decision even when the holding has been 
clearly superseded, or they continue to follow overridden decisions when 
interpreting similar language found in other statutes.6 In these contexts, it is 
often up for debate whether courts should follow the override or the prior 
precedent.7 In this Article, I show that similar questions have arisen under 
the ADAAA, but my primary objective is different. In this project, I 
highlight ongoing reliance on shadow precedents—here, Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc.8 and Toyota v. Williams9—that is unquestionably improper. 
There are numerous cases arising under the ADA itself, resolving conflicts 
that occurred after the ADAAA’s effective date, that apply pre-ADAAA 
case law rather than the standard Congress put in place.10  
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the ADAAA is a failure. Far from 
it. The overall number of citations to Sutton and to Toyota has dropped 
dramatically, far more quickly than is typical after most overrides.11 I found 
many decisions where courts were applying the new law correctly.12 But 
there were also many clear errors. Confusion was particularly pronounced 
in cases involving claims by plaintiffs that they were discriminated against 
 
 5.  See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The 
Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2012) [hereinafter 
Widiss, Hydra]; Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: 
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009) 
[hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents]. 
 6.  See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 5, at 542–56. 
 7.  Compare, e.g., Widiss, Hydra, supra note 5, at 933–41 (arguing that courts 
should reinterpret the language in related statutes in accordance with an override, so 
long as it is a plausible interpretation of the pre-existing language), with Charles A. 
Sullivan, Response, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance of Congress’s 
Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 157 (2012), available at 
http://www.texaslrev.com/90-see-also-157/ (arguing the prior precedent should govern 
interpretation of related statutes).  
 8.  527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 9.  534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 10.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 11.  See infra Part II. 
 12.  See infra Part IV.A; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, A PROMISING START: 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT, 
at 13 (2013), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2013/07232013 (reporting that 
“[a]ssessment of overall outcomes in court decisions interpreting and applying the 
ADAAA shows that the Act has had a dramatic impact in improving the success rates 
of plaintiff in establishing disability,” although also noting that many “still lost their cases 
on other grounds”). 
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for being “regarded as” disabled.13 Although the ADAAA rejected the 
standard for “regarded as” claims announced by the Supreme Court in 
Sutton, many courts—including some circuit courts—incorrectly assert that 
the prior standard remains controlling and that Sutton was abrogated on 
“other grounds.”14 
In compiling this study, I looked at decisions issued in 2013, 2014, or 
2015 found on Lexis that cited to Sutton or Toyota. I did not assess whether 
litigants properly briefed the new standards and courts ignored them, or 
whether (as I think more likely) lawyers failed to recognize the import of the 
override as they constructed their legal filings. Whatever the cause, the 
upshot is clear. Overrides are not self-enacting. Even five years after it was 
enacted, the ADAAA—an unusually strong and clear override—has failed 
to change fully the law on the ground. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces Sutton and Toyota 
and discusses the changes that the ADAAA made to the definition of 
disability. Part II shows that there has been a dramatic decline in citations to 
Sutton and to Toyota since the ADAAA was enacted, situating these 
numbers within the context of a larger study I am completing on the extent 
to which citations levels typically change after an override. Part III describes 
my research method for this study. Part IV discusses my findings, providing 
examples of cases that cite Sutton and Toyota for proper reasons, arguably 
proper reasons, and improper reasons. 
I. SUTTON, TOYOTA, AND THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT 
This Part summarizes the Supreme Court’s early case law interpreting 
the ADA’s definition of “disability” and the changes made by the ADAAA. 
Many readers may know this material well. However, since, as discussed 
below, review of court decisions demonstrates widespread confusion about 
some aspects of the override, I deem it important to cover this history in 
some detail. 
The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability.15 The 
primary definition of disability within the Act—as originally enacted, and 
still today, although, as discussed below, the ADAAA further explained key 
terms—includes three prongs: 
 
 13.  See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). 
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(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.16 
During the 1990s, the Supreme Court interpreted this language as setting a 
very high bar to establish that an individual had a qualifying disability. The 
leading cases were Sutton17 and Toyota.18 
In Sutton, the Court considered a claim brought by twin sisters with 
extreme myopia who were denied jobs as pilots because of their poor 
vision.19 Uncorrected, each had a visual acuity in each eye of 20/200 or worse, 
but with corrective lenses, each had normal (20/20) vision.20 The Court held 
that the plaintiffs did not have a qualifying disability.21 It stated impairments 
should be assessed in their mitigated, rather than unmitigated, state.22 This 
interpretation was based, in part, on the ADA’s statutory requirement that 
disability be evaluated “with respect to an individual,” thus making the 
disability analysis “an individualized inquiry.”23 In two companion cases, the 
Court held that commercial vehicle operators who had lost their jobs 
because of other impairments—high blood pressure, and vision in only one 
eye—also did not have qualifying disabilities, because their impairments 
likewise were not deemed limiting enough when considered after mitigating 
measures.24 The Court’s position that impairments should be assessed in a 
mitigated state was counter to the position taken by the three federal 
agencies responsible for implementing the Act, and it was also counter to 
several statements in the committee reports of the ADA.25 
The Court in Sutton also considered whether the sisters could succeed 
 
 16.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).  
 17.  Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 18.  Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).  
 19.  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. 
 20.  Id. (quoting App. 23) (alteration in original).  
 21.  Id. at 475, 488–89, 494. 
 22.  Id. at 481–89. 
 23.  Id. at 483 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 24.  See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999); Murphy v. U.P.S., 
Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519, 521 (1999).  
 25.  See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499–503 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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on a claim that they were “regarded as” having a disability.26 Again, the 
Court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claim failed.27 It interpreted the “regarded as” 
prong as requiring a plaintiff to prove that:  
(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, 
or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting 
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.28  
In other words, a plaintiff was required to prove a complicated 
counterfactual: Not only that an employer or other covered entity 
incorrectly believed that she had an impairment, but also that the covered 
entity incorrectly believed that the impairment (which might not even exist) 
substantially limited a major life activity. 
Three years later, the Court decided Toyota.29 This case was brought 
by a woman with carpal tunnel syndrome who had requested reasonable 
accommodations that would permit her to continue to work at an 
automobile manufacturing plant.30 She alleged that she was substantially 
limited in her ability to perform manual tasks, lift, and work, as well as other 
major life activities.31 The Court held that she did not have a qualifying 
disability.32 It stated that the terms “substantially limited” and “major life 
activities” both needed “to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding 
standard for qualifying as disabled.”33 It reasoned therefore that a plaintiff 
would need to show that his or her impairment “prevents or severely restricts 
the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most 
people’s daily lives,” and that the “impairment’s impact must also be 
permanent or long term.”34 The Court again emphasized that the ADA 
required an individualized inquiry, and that a simple diagnosis of 
impairment was insufficient.35 As in Sutton, the Court declined to decide 
definitively whether working could ever qualify as a major life activity, which 
 
 26.  Id. at 489.  
 27.  Id. at 494. 
 28.  Id. at 489.  
 29.  Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 30.  Id. at 187.  
 31.  Id. at 190.  
 32.  Id. at 187, 200–02. 
 33.  Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
 34.  Id. at 198 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2001)).  
 35.  Id. at 195, 198–99.  
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it characterized as a “difficult question.”36 However, it stated that an inability 
to work at one job would certainly be insufficient to meet the standard.37 The 
upshot of Sutton and Toyota, and lower court interpretations following these 
key precedents, was that it was extremely difficult for individuals to prove 
that they had serious enough impairments to qualify as disabilities under the 
Act.38 
In 2008, Congress enacted the ADAAA.39 The ADAAA was a broadly 
bipartisan bill, and it passed by unanimous consent in the Senate and by a 
vote of 402 to 17 in the House.40 The impetus for the law was clear: Congress 
strongly disagreed with much of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sutton and 
Toyota. The ADAAA’s statutory findings reaffirmed that “Congress 
intended that [the ADA] ‘provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.’”41 Congress then found that the “holdings of the Supreme Court 
in [Sutton] and its companion cases [had] narrowed the broad scope of 
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection 
for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect,” and that the 
“holding of the Supreme Court in [Toyota] further narrowed the broad 
scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA.”42 The ADAAA’s 
statutory purposes announced that Congress “rejected” central aspects of 
the holdings of Sutton and Toyota: Sutton’s analysis regarding mitigating 
measures; Sutton’s interpretation of the “regarded as” standard; Toyota’s 
 
 36.  Id. at 199–200; see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) 
(noting “some conceptual difficulty in defining ‘major life activities’ to include work, for 
it seems to argue in a circle”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 37.  Id. at 200–01.  
 38.  See, e.g., Feldblum et al., supra note 1, at 188, 218–24 (collecting lower court 
cases relying on Sutton and Toyota to hold that individuals with wide variety of 
impairments did not have qualifying disabilities); see also 153 CONG. REC. S8345 (daily 
ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (asserting that individuals with 
“impairments such as amputation, intellectual disabilities, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, 
diabetes, muscular dystrophy, and cancer” had all been denied coverage under the ADA 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Sutton and Toyota).  
 39.  ADA Amendments Act Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).  
 40.  See Federal Legislation and Administrative Clinic Plays Important Role in 
Passage of ADA Amendments Act, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (Sept. 2008), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/archiveada/documents/GULCpressrelease9-08.pdf. 
 41.  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3553 (2008) (quoting the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
12101(b)(1) (2012))).  
 42.  Id. §§ 2(a)(4), (5). 
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assertion that “substantially” and “major” “need to be interpreted strictly”; 
and the language in Toyota requiring individuals to establish that they are 
prevented or severely restricted from doing activities “of central importance 
to most people’s daily lives.”43 
To effectuate these purposes, Congress made several important 
changes to the substantive provisions of the ADA. Although the core 
provisions of the disability definition remain unchanged, the ADAAA adds 
an extensive list of activities that constitute major life activities.44 This list 
explicitly includes working,45 repudiating Sutton and Toyota’s suggestions 
that working might not be a major life activity.46 The ADAAA further 
provides that the concept of major life activities includes operation of “a 
major bodily function.”47 It also enacted “rules of construction” for the 
definition of disability.48 These include an explicit statement that the 
definition of disability shall be construed “in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals,” a clear repudiation of the Toyota Court’s holding that the 
definition should be construed “strictly.”49 
The ADAAA specifies that “[t]he determination of whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without 
regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.”50 This supersedes 
the analysis in Sutton and its companion cases as to mitigating measures,51 
although ordinary eyeglasses and contact lenses may still be considered.52 
The amended statute explicitly states that impairments that are episodic or 
 
 43.  Id. § 2(b)(2), (3), (4) (internal quotations omitted).  
 44.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2012) (providing that “major life activities include, 
but are not limited to caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, 
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, 
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working”). 
 45.  See id. 
 46.  See supra notes 3637 and accompanying text.  
 47.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (identifying bodily functions as including “functions of 
the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, 
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions”).  
 48.  Id. § 12102(4). 
 49.  Compare id. § 12102(4)(A) (emphasis added), with Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., 
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).  
 50.  Id. § 12102(4)(E).  
 51.  See supra text accompanying notes 2225.  
 52.  42 U.S.C § 12102(4)(c)(ii) (2012). The ADAAA also adds new language 
precluding the use of tests related to uncorrected vision unless they can be shown to be 
job-related and a business necessity. Id. § 12113(c). 
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in remission may be covered, and that a showing that an impairment 
supersedes one major life activity is sufficient to demonstrate a disability, 
even if it does not limit other major activities.53 These provisions supersede 
lower court decisions that had interpreted the standard differently.54 
The ADAAA also unequivocally supersedes the interpretation of the 
“regarded as” standard articulated in Sutton. The ADAAA provides that 
individuals can meet this requirement if they establish that they have been 
subjected to an adverse action or discrimination “because of an actual or 
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment 
limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”55 The same subsection 
states that the “regarded as” standard does not apply to impairments that 
are “transitory and minor,”56 suggesting, as discussed more fully below, that 
the other prongs of the definition may apply to transitory or temporary 
impairments.57 This is an implicit superseding of Toyota’s statement to the 
contrary.58 
Finally, the ADAAA explicitly authorizes the EEOC to issue 
regulations further explaining the statutory terms.59 The EEOC’s final 
regulations, approved by a bipartisan vote and published in the Federal 
Register on May 25, 2011, set forth the agency’s view of the proper 
interpretation of the new statutory language.60 The relevance of regulatory 
 
 53.  Id. §§ 12102(4)(C), (D).  
 54.  See, e.g., Flores v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2002) 
(holding that a plaintiff with monocular vision was did not have a qualifying disability, 
despite the fact that he was limited in the major life activity of seeing, because although 
he was “inconvenienced as a result of monocular vision,” the plaintiff failed to present 
evidence that he was “prevented from performing any daily activities” (emphasis 
added)); Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 453 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that 
a plaintiff with epilepsy did not have a qualifying disability because, with medication, he 
only suffered from “light seizures” occasionally rather than regular grand mal seizures). 
 55. 42 U.S.C § 12102(3) (emphasis added); for a detailed discussion of the 
background of “regarded as” protection and the substance of the override, see generally 
Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to 
Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability, 4 UTAH 
L. REV. 993 (2010). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 58.  See Toyota Motors Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (stating 
that an impairment must “be permanent or long term” in order to be considered a 
disability).  
 59.  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(6), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
 60.  See 29 C.F.R. 1630; Fact Sheet on the EEOC’s Final Regulations Implementing 
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language to the ongoing reliance on aspects of Sutton and Toyota is discussed 
more fully below.61 
II. CITATION PATTERNS AFTER THE OVERRIDE 
In a working paper, Brian Broughman and I study the extent to which 
levels of citations to Supreme Court decisions change after an override.62 We 
develop an original dataset of annual citations to three different groups of 
Supreme Court decisions: (1) those overridden by Congress; (2) those 
overruled by the Supreme Court; and (3) a “matched control” of cases that 
were neither overridden nor overruled. We then look at the extent to which 
the level of “net” citations (defined as the total number of positive or neutral 
citations to a case minus the total number of negative citations, such as 
warnings, to a case) change after an override as compared to cases in the 
other two groups. We find that, on average, citation levels to cases that have 
been overridden by Congress drop only minimally, but they fall quite 
dramatically after a judicial overruling. However, within this broad finding, 
there are some important distinctions. Citations to overridden cases typically 
drop far more quickly after “restorative overrides”—which explicitly 
repudiate a prior Supreme Court decision as an incorrect interpretation of 
the pre-existing law—than after overrides that simply update or clarify the 
pre-existing law. 
Our point is not that it is always improper to cite to an overridden 
precedent. As discussed more fully below, there are many reasons why 
courts would properly continue to cite to overridden precedents.63 That said, 
we would expect to see some change in citation pattern after an override. We 
find, however, that cases that have been superseded by overrides that are 
intended to update or clarify the law are almost indistinguishable from our 
control group; this suggests that overrides may not be playing their expected 
role in the separation of powers. 
The ADAAA was a “restorative” override. As discussed above, it was 
unmistakable that Congress intended to reject much of the Court’s analysis 
 
the ADAAA, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/adaaa_fact_sheet.cfm (last 
visited June 5, 2015). 
 61.  See infra Part IV. 
 62.  See generally Brian Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the Override: An 
Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent (USC Gould Sch. of Law Ctr. For L. & Soc. 
Sci., Paper No. CLASS15-12, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584048.  
 63.  See infra Part IV.A. 
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in Sutton and Toyota. The absolute number of citations to Sutton and to 
Toyota has dropped extraordinarily dramatically and quickly.64 
 
Table 1 – Sutton and Toyota Number of Citations per Year, sorted by 
Shepard’s Category (2008 is the year the ADAAA was enacted) 
 Sutton Toyota 
Year total positive warning total positive warning 
2003 212 56 0 208 58 0 
2004 196 64 0 191 57 0 
2005 263 74 0 262 59 0 
2006 345 92 0 313 87 0 
2007 263 89 0 304 73 0 
2008 286 91 4 303 76 3 
2009 243 81 31 226 56 33 
2010 228 82 31 218 67 36 
2011 165 48 22 182 35 31 
2012 131 22 19 122 11 22 
 
The citation profiles of both cases look, generally, like those of a case that 
has been overruled, rather than the typical overridden case. These raw 
numbers suggest the majority of courts are now properly applying the new 
standard, rather than the old superseded standard.65 Presumably, many 
employees who would not have been considered disabled before are now 
deemed to meet the statutory standard.66  
 
 64.  In earlier work, I have suggested that overrides would be more effective if 
Congress explicitly repudiated Supreme Court decisions it was overriding in statutory 
language. See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 5, at 562–63. The unusually rapid 
drop in citation levels after the ADAAA, which includes such statements, suggests this 
may be correct. 
 65.  See also National Council on Disability, supra note 12 (collecting and analyzing 
early cases under the amended law, and concluding that courts were generally applying 
the new standards correctly).  
 66.  See id., at 13. There is some concern, however, that courts may now be applying 
an extremely restrictive interpretation of what is required to show that one is “qualified” 
to do the job. See generally, e.g., Befort, Empirical Examination, supra note 1. 
  
930 Drake Law Review [Vol. 63 
 
 But in the sections below, I show that even here—where the override 
was quite clear and where there was widespread discussion of the override 
in both popular and legal press—courts continue to rely on Toyota and 
Sutton as shadow precedents. In some instances, it is arguably reasonable 
that the old rules should apply. But in many of the examples discussed below, 
courts (and likely the lawyers appearing before them) have simply made 
mistakes. 
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
The research method for this Article was straightforward: I used 
Shepard’s citation service to identify cases decided during 2013, 2014, or 2015 
that cited Sutton or Toyota.67 This means that I did not read any of the 
(presumably many) recent disability cases that did not cite either Sutton or 
Toyota. Thus, I do not and cannot draw any general conclusions about how 
the ADA is being interpreted. My focus is narrower: I document how Sutton 
and Toyota continue to shape emerging law, more than five years after the 
ADAAA was enacted. 
After identifying the universe of recent cases included in Lexis68 that 
cite to Sutton or Toyota, I then read many of the decisions, looking for 
patterns or cases that illustrated mistakes or confusion particularly well. 
Again, I am not suggesting that the cases discussed below are necessarily 
representative of the full body of current disability law. I certainly hope they 
are not; I would like to believe that they are outliers. That said, some 
mistakes were widely repeated within the dataset—and that suggests that 
there may be serious problems with some aspects of how the ADAAA is 
being implemented. 
 
 67.  I chose to limit research to these recent years because I hoped that most 
decisions would consider facts that arose after the ADAAA’s effective date. I found that 
this was more mixed than I had expected, as discussed below. See infra Part IV.A. 
 68.  This data set includes a significant number of decisions issued by district or 
circuit courts that are picked up on Lexis (and often Westlaw) but not authorized for 
publication. I deem these decisions important for two reasons. First, many resolve an 
individual’s claim relying on an incorrect legal standard. Second, it has become 
increasingly common for courts to cite to unpublished decisions, even if they are not 
formally afforded precedential weight. The dataset does not include any decisions that 
were not found on Lexis at all.  
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IV. SUTTON AND TOYOTA AS SHADOW PRECEDENTS 
A. Proper Reliance on Sutton and Toyota 
There are many good reasons for courts to continue to cite to 
overridden precedents. First, an override may only supersede a part of a 
decision. Lower courts are bound to apply Supreme Court precedent except 
to the extent that it is superseded. As discussed below, it is sometimes 
ambiguous or unclear where to draw the line. But, there are aspects of the 
Sutton and Toyota decisions that are clearly still “good law.” For example, 
Sutton includes a summary of the ADA’s basic prohibition of discrimination 
on the basis of disability.69 Congress did not change this operative language, 
and courts might still reasonably cite it. 
Second, statutory overrides, like statutes more generally, are typically 
deemed to be prospective rather than retroactive.70 The ADAAA stated that 
it would become effective on January 1, 2009.71 Courts have consistently held 
that factual disputes that arose before this date should be resolved under the 
ADA as it was interpreted prior to the ADAAA.72 Sutton and Toyota are 
leading interpretations, and courts properly continue to cite to them in such 
cases. Even though I did not consider any decisions issued before 2013, my 
dataset included many disputes over events that occurred prior to 2009.73 
Third, courts frequently cite to Sutton or Toyota to explain what the 
standard had been under the law and then discuss how Congress changed the 
standard in enacting the ADAAA.74 Shepard’s generally indicates such 
 
 69.  See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1999).  
 70.  See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1994); Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 263 (1994); see also Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra 
note 5, at 534–36 (discussing competing arguments as to whether restorative overrides 
should be interpreted retroactively).  
 71.  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008).  
 72.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 150–52 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(declining to apply ADAAA retroactively); Carraras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 
F.3d 25, 33 n.7 (1st Cir. 2010) (same); Milholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 
562, 565 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); EEOC v. Argo Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469–70 
n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (same).  
 73.  This was particularly true with respect to circuit court decisions, since they had 
already reached the appeals stage. See, e.g., Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y., 748 F.3d 
471, 475 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 74.  See, e.g., Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1267–70 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (discussing how disability definition in the ADAAA and EEOC regulations 
differed from the Court’s interpretations in Toyota and Sutton). 
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citations as “negative” citations. My larger project with Professor 
Broughman subtracts such “negative” citations from the overall citation 
count to assess “net” (presumably positive) citations. However, in combing 
through the cases for this Article, I discovered that Shepard’s is not always 
consistent in its signaling. There were decisions that properly noted the 
override and rejected the analyses from Sutton and Toyota that were not 
identified by Shepard’s as “negative” cites.75 
B. Arguably Proper Reliance on Sutton and Toyota 
There were also decisions that I would classify as “arguably proper” in 
following Sutton and Toyota rather than the ADAAA. My prior work has 
identified two kinds of questions that often arise after an override is enacted: 
whether and how an override should affect interpretation of other laws with 
similar language that were not amended,76 and whether the underlying 
rationales of a decision, as well as its holding, are superseded.77 Both arise 
with respect to the ADAAA. 
1. Related Statutes 
When Congress amends a statute to supersede a judicial interpretation, 
it is often debatable what effect—if any—that override should have on the 
interpretation of similar language found in other statutes. In the ADAAA 
context, these include state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
disability, and other federal laws, such as the Fair Housing Act, that likewise 
prohibit disability discrimination. 
Some courts have wrestled thoughtfully with these complexities. For 
example, Pennsylvania’s disability discrimination law, the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act (PHRA), is quite similar to the pre-amendment 
ADA; prior to the enactment of the ADAAA amendments, it was 
 
 75.  See, e.g., Cain v. Atelier Esthetique Inst. of Esthetics, Inc., 13 Civ. 7834, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88115, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014); Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., 
Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00564, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050, at *7–8 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014).  
 76.  In the employment discrimination context, there has been extensive litigation 
on this point regarding the standard of causation that governs individual disparate 
treatment claims. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013); 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 173, 176–77 (2009); Widiss, Hydra¸ supra note 5, 
at 881–900, 908–20 (discussing this issue and collecting cases). 
 77.  See generally Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 5, at 531–34, 542–46, 551–
56.  
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interpreted identically.78 Several federal district courts have concluded, 
however, that Pennsylvania’s failure to enact amendments comparable to 
the ADAAA means that the Pennsylvania law continues to be governed by 
the standards set forth in Sutton and Toyota.79 By contrast, the Iowa 
Supreme Court reasoned that even though Iowa had not amended its statute, 
Iowa’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of disability could be 
interpreted consistent with the more generous understanding of disability 
adopted in the ADAAA, as well as with earlier interpretations of the Iowa 
law.80  
The approach endorsed by the Iowa court is similar to that which I have 
advocated in earlier writing.81 That is, there should be a rebuttable 
presumption that state statutes be interpreted consistently with federal 
analogues—as amended by overrides—so long as the language of the state 
statute can reasonably bear this interpretation. This approach furthers 
efficiency and consistency. It also reflects the reality that although it may be 
reasonable to assume that a state legislature intends a state statute to be 
interpreted generally in accordance with similar federal law, there is rarely 
any basis to know whether that state legislature specifically agreed with the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal statute on a particular point 
or with any Congressional repudiation of that Supreme Court interpretation. 
That said, there are also some strong justifications for the contrary position 
 
 78.  See, e.g., Slagle v. Cnty of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 265 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating 
that the PHRA will be interpreted identically to federal antidiscrimination laws, unless 
language is present which requires a different interpretation); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. 
Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[O]ur analysis of an ADA claim applies equally 
to a PHRA claim”). 
 79.  See, e.g., Koci v. Cent. City Optical Co., No. CV 14-2983, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
160940, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2014); Riley v. St. Mary Med. Ctr., No. 13-CV-7205, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72366, at *10–11 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2014) (stating that while the 
plaintiff had “adequately pled a disability under the ADAAA,” she had not “pled the 
existence of a disability under the [PHRA], which is to be interpreted under the pre-
amendment ADA standard for disability”); Rubano v. Farrell Area Sch. Dist., 991 F. 
Supp. 2d 678, 689 n.7, 704 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (stating that because the Pennsylvania 
legislature failed to amend the PHRA to fall in line with the ADAAA, the standards 
under each are different and thus PHRA claims would be analyzed under the pre-
amendment ADA standards). 
 80.  Goodpaster v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 849 N.W.2d 1, 9–13 (Iowa 2014); cf. 
Roghelia v. Hopedale Mining, LLC, No. 13HA8, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 2874, at *15–
16 (June 23, 2014) (discussing how Ohio’s disability law had been interpreted more 
generously than the federal law and that the ADAAA meant that the federal law was 
now again similar to Ohio’s standard). 
 81.  See Widiss, Hydra, supra note 5, at 918–20, 933–37. 
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taken by the courts in Pennsylvania.  
Similar questions can arise with respect to whether the ADAAA 
changed the interpretation of federal laws prohibiting disability 
discrimination in other contexts, such as housing. For example, some courts 
follow pre-ADAAA interpretations of the “disability” definition when 
deciding claims under the Fair Housing Act.82 For reasons explored at length 
elsewhere, I think courts should re-interpret the language of these other 
federal statutes in accordance with the meaning endorsed by the override, 
so long as that is a plausible interpretation of the pre-existing language.83 
However, this is likewise an area where there is room for disagreement, and, 
accordingly, I classify ongoing reliance on Sutton and Toyota when 
interpreting either state or federal statutes with language similar to that of 
the ADA as “arguably proper.”  
2. Underlying Reasoning 
There are also questions about the extent to which the reasoning 
underlying the holdings in Sutton and Toyota was superseded. A leading 
example of this question is the Sutton Court’s assertion that the ADA 
requires an “individualized inquiry” and the related point in Toyota that 
“merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of 
the ADA.”84 Both propositions are still cited routinely without indication 
that the ADAAA affects their ongoing viability.85 And it is true that the 
ADAAA does not include statutory language that directly supersedes these 
conclusions and that the EEOC’s regulations on point continue to affirm 
these general propositions.86 
 
 82.  See, e.g., Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1288 
(11th Cir. 2014) (following Sutton in interpreting the Fair Housing Act (FHA) “because 
of the similarity between the pre-amendment ADA and the FHA”).  
 83.  See generally Widiss, Hydra, supra note 5, at 926–42.  
 84.  See supra text accompanying notes 23 & 35.  
 85.  See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Xerox Corp., No. 12-CV-6158T, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
39537, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) (citing Sutton for the proposition courts must 
make an individualized assessment of whether an impairment constitutes a disability); 
Martin v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., No. CV-H-13-0718, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132998, 
at *15 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2014) (same); Purcell v. Fadlallah, No. 10-13444, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 99470, at *21 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2013) (same). 
 86.  See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2014) (“An impairment need not prevent, or 
significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in 
order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will 
constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.”) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R § 
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However, as discussed above, the ADAAA defined “major life 
activity” to include “major bodily functions,” such as “functions of the 
immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, 
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”87 In 
other words, under the amended statutory language, any condition that 
substantially limits the working of any of these bodily systems is sufficient to 
constitute a disability. 
The EEOC regulations now take the position (which I believe is 
reasonable) that many conditions—including intellectual disabilities, cancer, 
diabetes, epilepsy, major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and bipolar disorder—will “virtually always” be sufficient to satisfy the 
statutory standard.88 Thus the ADAAA, at least as interpreted by the 
EEOC, comes quite close to adopting a diagnosis-based theory of disability 
for many kinds of impairments. Nonetheless, courts routinely cite to the 
assertions in Sutton and Toyota’s that an individualized inquiry is required 
without considering—or even acknowledging—that the statutory language 
regarding major bodily functions and the EEOC’s new guidance offers 
strong grounds for reconsidering extensive reliance on these propositions 
from the earlier cases.89 Some of these decisions are in cases where the 
plaintiff alleged an impairment that is included on the EEOC’s list as 
“virtually always” sufficient.90 
There is also room for disagreement regarding the extent to which the 
ADAAA superseded Toyota’s holding that an “impairment’s impact must 
also be permanent or long term.”91 As noted above, the ADAAA 
 
1630.2(j)(iv) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major 
life activity requires an individualized assessment.”). 
 87.  Id. § 12102(2)(B).  
 88.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3).  
 89.  See generally cases cited supra note 85.  
 90.  See, e.g., Purcell v. Fadlallah, No. 10-13444, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99470, at 
*19–21 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2013) (holding plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient 
individualized evidence to establish that diabetes was a qualifying disability). But see 29 
C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(viii), (3) app. (2014) (stating that “an individual with diabetes is 
substantially limited in endocrine function” and suggesting that accordingly the 
individualized assessment should be “particularly simple and straightforward”). It may 
be that the plaintiff in Purcell failed to meet even this lower standard, but it is difficult 
to know because the court relied exclusively on pre-ADAAA precedent in reaching its 
conclusion that the showing was inadequate. See Purcell, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 99470, at 
*19–21.  
 91.  Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (citing 29 
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emphasizes that the definition of disability should be interpreted in favor of 
“broad coverage,” and that Toyota set an unreasonably high bar. The 
clarification of the standard for “regarded as” claims explicitly states that it 
does not include impairments that are “transitory and minor,” and it defines 
“transitory” as an impairment with an “actual or expected duration of six 
months or less.”92 However, this statutory reference to transitory and minor 
applies only to the “regarded as” prong; there is no such limitation for the 
“actual” or “record of” prongs of the definition. Accordingly, the EEOC 
takes the position that a short term or temporary impairment “lasting or 
expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within 
the meaning” of these aspects of the definition of disability.93 (Of course, to 
qualify as an actual disability, the impairment cannot be “minor,” since a 
plaintiff must show that it substantially limits a major life activity.94) Many 
courts have agreed with this interpretation.95 On the other hand, some courts 
have held that, even after the passage of the ADAAA, temporary disabilities 
are generally insufficient.96 While I disagree with this interpretation, it is 
probably fair to say it is not clearly counter to the plain language of the 
ADAAA. 
C. Mistaken Reliance on Sutton and Toyota 
The sections above identify proper and arguably proper reasons for 
courts to continue to cite to Sutton and Toyota. This section, by contrast, 
documents mistakes—ongoing reliance on shadow precedents where it is 
clear that it is unwarranted. This is not to say that the outcomes in all of these 
cases were incorrect. There are probably many cases discussed below where 
it was appropriate for a court to grant the employer’s motion for summary 
judgment or motion to dismiss. But the grounds supporting that outcome 
 
C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2001)). 
 92.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). 
 93.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix).  
 94.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
 95.  See, e.g., Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920–21 
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (holding that restriction on lifting due to a high risk pregnancy could be 
a qualifying disability); Esparza v. Pierre Foods, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104–05, 1106 
(S.D. Ohio 2013) (finding that kidney stones that required surgery and two weeks 
recovery time could be a qualifying disability).  
 96.  See, e.g., Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00564(VLB), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27050, at *9–12 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014) (stating that despite EEOC guidance on 
the matter, the court and “several other courts in this Circuit . . . adhere[] to the 
traditional notion that temporary or short term disabilities are not covered by the statute 
absent allegations highlighting the extreme severity of the disability”). 
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were incorrect. In some instances, even applying the more generous standard 
set forth in the ADAAA, courts might conclude that the individual did not 
have a qualifying disability. And I think it quite likely that in many of the 
cases, the employer might have been able to prove that it had a legitimate 
non-discriminatory rationale for the challenged adverse action. But it also 
seems highly probable that at least some of the plaintiffs’ claims were 
improperly dismissed. 
More generally, these cases are concerning because, regardless of 
whether the outcome in any particular case was correct or incorrect, the 
incorrect reasoning of the decision may be followed by other courts, thus 
perpetuating the ongoing, and improper, influence of Sutton and Toyota. 
Indeed, in our larger study of overrides, Professor Broughman and I found 
that early citations—either positive or negative—to overridden decisions 
were extremely influential in setting paths that other courts followed.97 My 
hope in writing this Article is that it will help lawyers and judges stamp out 
these mistakes. 
Our adversarial system relies primarily on lawyers to identify relevant 
law and make legal arguments that advance their client’s position.98 Given 
the substance of the ADAAA, in most instances it would be in the plaintiff’s 
interest to highlight the statutory changes. However, defense counsel should 
also be expected to craft their arguments under the revised legal standard, 
whether or not plaintiffs properly cite it.99 And judges should be expected to 
apply the operative law.100 This is particularly true because ADA cases are 
very common in the federal court docket. Thus, even if the parties in a given 
case failed to cite properly to the new standard, it is reasonable to assume 
that the courts deciding cases that I reviewed (from 2013–2015) had decided 
other post-ADAAA cases.101 Indeed, in several cases, courts applied the 
 
 97.  See Broughman & Widiss, supra note 62, at 22–24 & Table 4.  
 98.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2013) (stating that 
lawyers must pursue “whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a 
client’s cause or endeavor”). 
 99.  See id. R. 3.3(1), (2) (2013) (providing that a lawyer shall not knowingly make 
a false statement of law or fail to disclose “legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed 
by opposing counsel”).  
 100.  See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014) (“The role of this Court 
is to apply the statute as written.”); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 
(1988) (stating that courts are bound to enforce valid statutes).  
 101.  Approximately 5,000 ADA cases (1964 cases in ADA-employment, and 3039 
cases in ADA-other) were filed in the U.S. district courts in 2013; there has been a steady 
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ADAAA standards but chastised counsel for failing to recognize the 
significance of the overrides and improperly resting on pre-ADAAA case 
law in their briefing.102 The examples that follow, however, demonstrate that 
sometimes such mistakes were not corrected. 
A comprehensive review of the briefing in these cases was beyond the 
scope of this project.103 Accordingly, I cannot determine where the 
breakdown occurred. Did plaintiff’s counsel fail to cite to the proper legal 
standard? Did defense counsel try to obscure the significance of the 
changes? Or did courts, even if the parties briefed the matter properly, 
nonetheless fail to apply the correct standard? And if so, was this because of 
ideological disagreements with the revised law? Or simply careless 
mistakes? Whatever the cause, the end result was that the wrong law was 
applied.  
1. Ignoring the ADAAA Entirely 
I was rather shocked—and highly troubled—to find a significant 
number of cases in my data set that relied on Sutton, Toyota, and other pre-
ADAAA case law without acknowledging the ADAAA at all, even though 
 
increase in ADA filings since the ADAAA was enacted. See Judicial Facts and Figures 
2013, Table 4.4, US COURTS.GOV (Sep. 30, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/ 
table/44/judicial-facts-and-figures/2013/09/30. By contrast, many other overrides are 
rather obscure, and it is less surprising (and perhaps less problematic) that judges 
sometimes fail to properly apply the governing standard if the parties fail to brief the 
legal changes. See Deborah A. Widiss, Response, Identifying Congressional Overrides 
Should Not Be This Hard, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 145, 157–59 (2014) (discussing 
considerable lag time before courts begin to flag overrides).  
 102.  See Aldini v. Kroger Co., No. 12-13641, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172061, at *18–
22 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2014), appeal filed Jan. 16, 2015 (discussing how the defendant 
failed to recognize the ADAAA in their arguments and “failed to set forth any case law 
or argument that does not directly rely upon specifically rejected standards”); Johnson 
v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, Civil Action No. ELH-12-2519, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41669, 
at *44–45 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2014) (noting “neither party has addressed the impact on the 
cited case law of the enactment of the [ADAAA]” but holding the case is governed by 
the ADAAA).  
 103.  Cf. Kevin Barry, Brian East & Marcy Karin, Pleading Disability After the 
ADAAA, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. J. 1, 56–62 (2013) (analyzing early complaints filed 
under the ADAAA and concluding that plaintiffs’ lawyers often failed to effectively 
plead the new standard); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 12, at 93 (“In more 
than a few [early] cases … [under the ADAAA, plaintiff’s] changes for favorable 
outcomes were squandered by substandard, sometimes dismal, legal pleadings and briefs 
on their behalf.”). 
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the facts arose after the ADAAA’s effective date. These include cases 
relying on Sutton’s assertion that the effect of mitigating measures must be 
considered,104 on Toyota’s assertion that an “impairment’s impact must . . . 
be permanent or long term,”105 on Toyota’s assertion that the ADA is 
intended to create a “demanding standard,”106 on Toyota’s assertion that it 
must prevent or severely restrict the individual’s ability to perform activities 
that are central to daily life,107 and, as discussed below, many relying 
improperly on Sutton’s “regarded as” standard.108 
In some of these decisions, both sides were represented by counsel.109 
Many others included a plaintiff who was pro se, which might explain why 
the ADAAA was not properly discussed in court filings (although, as noted 
above, defense counsel is obligated to apply governing law, even if the 
plaintiff failed to do so).110 A sizable subset of these decisions arose under 
Title II of the ADA, which governs discrimination by public entities, rather 
than Title I, which governs discrimination by private employers.111 The 
ADA’s primary definition of disability applies to the Act as a whole—and 
the amendments made by the ADAAA to that definition likewise apply to 
the ADA as a whole.112 Thus, the issue is quite different from the question 
 
 104.  See, e.g., Rathy v. Wetzel, No. 13-72, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115331, at *12 
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2014); Pleasant v. D&N Elec. Co., No. 1:11-CV-2748-TWT, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 46937, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2013). 
 105.  Shaughnessy v. Xerox Corp., No. 12-CV-6158T, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39537, 
at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015); Rodriguez v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 
No. 14-CV-6038T, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106566, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2014). 
 106.  Roebuck v. Summit Cnty. Dep’t of Jobs & Family Servs., No. 5:13 CV 2816, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73906, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 30, 2014).  
 107.  Shaughnessy, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39537, at *7; Rodriguez, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 106566, at *7; Jones v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:12-CV-00831, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30435, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013). 
 108.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 109.  See, e.g., Pleasant, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46937, at *1; Jones, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30435, at *1. 
 110.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106566, at *1; Roebuck, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 73906, at *1. 
 111.  See, e.g., Koch v. Vill. of Schiller Park, No. 12-CV-1224, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
82110, at *15 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2014); Fuller v. Wheat, No. 4:12-CV-03957-CLS-TMP, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188450, at *17–18 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 8, 2013); George v. Cnty. of 
Jefferson, No. 2:10-CV-3389-AKK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141621, at *28 (N.D. Ala. 
Sept. 30, 2013); Campbell v. Thomas, No. 2:10-CV-694-WC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
137320, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2013). 
 112.  See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008).  
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discussed above regarding whether the ADAAA should affect the 
interpretation of distinct federal laws such as the Fair Housing Act or state 
laws. There is no question that it is improper to continue to interpret ADA 
Title II claims pursuant to the superseded standards. While undeniably an 
error, it is perhaps not surprising that improper reliance on Sutton and 
Toyota might linger in this context longer than in employment cases, since 
the amendments may have received more attention for their effects in the 
employment law context. This suggests that there may need to be further 
education highlighting that the amendments apply to the ADA as a whole.  
I also found several cases that arose under the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, an Act that (among other things) prohibits employment discrimination 
on the basis of disability by the federal government and federal 
contractors.113 Although the Rehabilitation Act predates the ADA, the 
ADAAA amended the Rehabilitation Act to incorporate into that statute 
the ADA’s (amended) definition of disability.114 Despite this clear change in 
the law, there were several Rehabilitation Act cases in my dataset that 
improperly applied pre-ADAAA case law (i.e., Sutton and Toyota).115 This 
is particularly ironic since part of the rationale for the ADAAA was to 
return to interpretations that had governed disability discrimination under 
the Rehabilitation Act prior to the ADA.116  
It bears emphasis that all of the cases that I reviewed were decided in 
2013 or later. Thus, they were decided at least four years after the ADAAA 
became effective.117 The courts and the lawyers appearing before them had 
ample time to learn about the amendments. But these cases were decided as 
if the ADAAA had never been enacted. 
 
 113.  29 U.S.C. § 701 (2014). 
 114.  Pub. L. 110-325, § 7, 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 (2008); see also 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) 
(stating that for many provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, including the provisions 
addressing employment discrimination found in subchapter V of the Act, the term 
“disability” means “the meaning given it in section 12102 of Title 42” [the ADA]). My 
thanks to Steve Befort for helping clarify my understanding of the interaction between 
the two statutes.  
 115.  See, e.g., Nadel v. Shinseki, No. 12-CV-1902, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153564, at 
*14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014); Williams v. Donahoe, No. 3:14-CV-00002-DSC, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83574, at *9–11 (W.D.N.C. June 19, 2014). 
 116.  See Pub. L. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) (stating ADAAA was 
intended to “reinstate” the reasoning of a 1987 Supreme Court decision establishing the 
standard for “regarded as” claims under the Rehabilitation Act).  
 117.  See id. § 3559 (providing the ADAAA became effective on January 1, 2009). 
  
2015] Still Kickin’ After All These Years 941 
 
2. Acknowledging the ADAAA but Misconstruing It 
There were also a significant number of decisions that acknowledged 
in some way that the ADAAA had been enacted, but nonetheless applied 
pre-ADAAA case law in contexts where it had clearly been superseded. In 
many instances, this meant following statements in Sutton or Toyota that are 
no longer controlling. Somewhat more subtly—but equally inappropriate—
this category also included numerous decisions in which courts followed 
circuit or district court precedents applying the rules announced by Sutton 
and Toyota, without discussing whether these lower court precedents should 
be reconsidered in light of the changes made by the ADAAA. It is almost 
certain that I only saw a small subset of the decisions that made this second 
kind of mistake because I only searched for cases that cited Sutton or Toyota. 
Thus, cases only ended up in my dataset if the decision also cited to Sutton 
or Toyota (sometimes in the context of indicating that the lower court 
decision had quoted these Supreme Court decisions).  
For example, in one case, the plaintiff alleged that he had sprained his 
back in a workplace injury.118 He received physical therapy for a month, and 
he alleged that he “could not sleep in bed or lay down because of the pain” 
for several months and that co-workers routinely commented on the pain he 
was in.119 The court referenced the ADAAA, but then relied on a litany of 
pre-ADAAA Supreme Court, circuit court, and district court case law to 
hold this injury did not meet the standard as a qualifying disability.120 In 
another decision, the plaintiff alleged that he was unable to raise his right 
arm over his head and that his doctor had restricted him from lifting more 
than 15 pounds.121 The court relied on pre-ADAAA case law, holding that 
comparable lifting restrictions were insufficient, as well as referring to pre-
ADAAA decisions regarding what was needed to establish a substantial 
limitation with respect to the ability to work, without assessing at all how the 
amendments should affect this analysis.122 
The roots of many pre-ADAAA circuit and district court decisions 
were cut out by the ADAAA. Accordingly, the conclusions reached in these 
decisions—such as whether temporary disabilities can qualify, or whether 
 
 118.  See De La Noval v. Papa’s Dodge, No. 3:14-CV-00460-VLB, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38736, at *5–6 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2015).  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at *12–15. 
 121. Morris, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133168, at *25. 
 122. Id. at *25–30.  
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particular kinds of conditions can qualify—need to be rethought in light of 
the amendments (even though these lower court decisions may not 
themselves be “red-flagged” on Lexis or Westlaw). Many of the court 
decisions that I reviewed properly undertook this analysis. As one court 
explained, pre-ADAAA cases “carry little, if any, precedential weight with 
respect to the issue of [disability]” when deciding a case where facts arose 
after the effective date of the ADAAA.123 And in certain circumstances, 
courts reasonably determined that the rules established by those earlier 
decisions are still an appropriate interpretation of the amended Act.124 But 
it is undeniably improper to reflexively cite to pre-ADAAA lower court 
decisions as controlling law without considering whether the conclusions 
they reach are still valid. 
3. The “Regarded As” Problem 
Despite the ADAAA’s clear renunciation of Sutton’s interpretation of 
the “regarded as” standard,125 numerous courts continue to apply it. These 
cases are a subset of the categories above. That is, there were some decisions 
that cited to Sutton without acknowledging the ADAAA at all.126 There were 
far more that recognized that the ADAAA had superseded Sutton in many 
respects but asserted, incorrectly, that its articulation of the standard for 
 
 123. Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 2d 472, 483 n.3 
(E.D.N.C. 2011); see also, e.g., Aldini v. Kroger Co., No. 12-13641, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
172061, at *21 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2014) (“[I]t is clear that to the extent that the 
[ADAAA] specifically rejected the more strict and narrow standards set forth in [Sutton] 
and [Toyota], the Court cannot rely upon decisions that rely upon those same rejected 
standards.”); EEOC v. Midwest Reg’l Med. Ctr., LLC, No. CIV-13-789-M, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 114297, at *3–7 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 18, 2014) (holding that pre-ADAAA 
Tenth Circuit precedent regarding the standard for disability was no longer binding 
because it relied on aspects of Sutton and prior regulations that had been superseded).  
 124.  For example, as noted above, some courts have decided, after thoughtful 
analysis, that despite new language in the ADAAA and the EEOC’s new regulations, 
temporary conditions are almost always insufficient to qualify as a disability. See supra 
note 96 and accompanying text. This kind of reasoned conclusion is quite different from 
decisions that rely on prior decisions holding that temporary disabilities cannot qualify 
without considering the ADAAA at all.  
 125.  See supra notes 43 & 55 and accompanying text. 
 126.  See, e.g., Young v. UPS, 992 F. Supp. 2d 817, 835–36 (M.D. Tenn. 2014); Allen 
v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. Silicon Valley, No. 12-1656 PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96434, at *6, n.19 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2013); Jones v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:12-CV-00831, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30435, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013); Jones v. Econ. Opportunity 
Planning Ass’n of Greater Toledo, No. 3:11 CV 2084, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15511, at 
*18–19 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2013). 
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“regarded as” claims was still controlling.127 Because these mistakes were so 
common, the issue merits more extensive discussion.  
A case from the District of Colorado illustrates the problem well.128 
The court began by quoting the new language from the ADAAA which 
states that an individual must simply establish that she has been subject to 
an adverse action “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a 
major life activity.”129 But immediately after quoting this language, the court 
opined: 
In the Tenth Circuit, “[a] person is regarded as disabled when (1) a 
covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or 
(2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting 
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 
Johnson v. Weld County, Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1219 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In both cases, it is 
necessary that [the employer] entertain misperceptions about the 
individual—it must believe either that [the individual] has a 
substantially limiting impairment that [the individual] does not have or 
that [the individual] has a substantially limiting impairment when, in 
fact, the impairment is not so limiting.” Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999), superseded 
by statute on other grounds, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).130 
There are a few important things to note about this passage—mistakes that 
are repeated in several other decisions in my dataset. First, the court relies 
upon Sutton and asserts that Sutton has been “superseded by statute on other 
 
 127.  See, e.g., Wingfield v. Escallate, LLC, No. 5:12 CV 2620, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
139885, at *15–16 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2014); Morris v. Town of Islip, No. 12-CV-2984-
JFB-SIC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133168, at *21–22 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014); see also, 
e.g.,  McDonald v. Care Ctr. (Linda Vista), Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01882-CL, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 108925, *11–12 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2014) (quoting the ADAAA “regarded 
as” standard but then applying Sutton’s standard without acknowledging that it 
conflicted with the new standard); Dennis v. Airport Chevrolet, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-
00008-CL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22893, at *10–11 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2014) (similar).  
 128.  See Morgan v. Goodwill, No. 12-cv-00274-WYD-CBS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
178769 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013).  
 129.  Id. at *19 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) (2012)) (emphasis added).  
 130.  Id. at *19–20 (alterations in original). 
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grounds.” Other court decisions that quote Sutton for this proposition make 
the same assertion.131 This is incorrect. As discussed above, the ADAAA 
replaced Sutton’s interpretation of what was required to establish a 
“regarded as” claim with new statutory language.132 Second, the court relies 
on circuit court precedent as establishing the rule that applies “[i]n the Tenth 
Circuit.” But this circuit court precedent also relied on Sutton, and its 
conclusions now need to be reconsidered. And third, and in some respects 
most troubling, the court does not seem to recognize that there is a conflict 
between the statutory language it quotes and the standard announced in the 
case law upon which it relies—that is, that the statutory language 
unequivocally repudiates the prior interpretation announced in the case law.  
 This kind of confusion is found not only in district court cases, but also 
in at least a few circuit court decisions.133 These characterizations of the post-
ADAAA “regarded as” standard are obviously wrong; it is almost certain 
that other circuit court decisions will eventually clarify the law. But in the 
meantime, employees are being held to a standard that has been repudiated. 
And in at least some cases, applying Sutton’s “regarded as” standard likely 
led to the wrong result, at least on the threshold question of whether the 
employee was “regarded as” having a disability. For example, in one case, 
the plaintiff hit his head at work, leading to doctor-imposed restrictions on 
lifting, driving, pulling, pushing, stooping, or bending.134 The court, however, 
quoted Sutton and Sixth Circuit precedent applying Sutton to assert that 
“settled law” required a plaintiff to prove that an employer ascribes to the 
individual an inability to perform the job when “in fact, the individual is 
 
 131.  See, e.g., Wingfield v. Escallate, LLC, No. 5:12 CV 2620, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
139885, at *16 n. 3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2014) (asserting that Sutton was “abrogated on 
other grounds”); Moss v. Pennyrile Rural Elec. Coop., No. 5:13-CV-00212, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 36096, at *15 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 19, 2014) (asserting that Sutton was 
“overruled on other grounds”); see also generally cases cited supra note 127.  
 132.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See Koessel v. Sublette Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 717 F.3d 736, 741–42 (10th Cir. 
2013) (relying on the pre-ADAAA “regarded as” standard in deciding a factual dispute 
that arose after the effective date of the ADAAA); Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors, 
414 F. App’x 764, 771 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sutton’s “regarded as” standard and 
asserting that Sutton was “abrogated by statute . . . on other grounds”). The facts in Baker 
pre-dated the ADAAA. See id. at 768. Thus it was appropriate for the court in Baker to 
follow Sutton, but its incorrect assertion regarding the effect of the override has misled 
lower courts within the Sixth Circuit deciding post-ADAAA cases. See, e.g., Wingfield, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139885, at *16 n.3 (citing Baker in a post-ADAAA case for the 
assertion that Sutton’s “regarded as” standard had been “retained by the 6th Circuit”).  
 134.  Young v. UPS, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 817, 825 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).  
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perfectly able to meet the job’s duties.”135 The court then pointed out that 
the employer had honored the employee’s medical restrictions and the 
employee’s assertion that he had workplace limitations as evidence that he 
could not meet the “regarded as” standard.136   
Under the ADAAA, the analysis in a “regarded as” claim should be 
straightforward. Courts simply need to determine whether the plaintiff was 
subject to an adverse action because of an actual or perceived impairment.137 
Indeed, the EEOC suggests that “regarded as” claims should be the default 
ADA claim in cases that do not include a claim for reasonable 
accommodations, because they (should) avoid all of the tough questions 
regarding how significant a limitation needs to be to meet the standard of 
“substantially limiting.”138 Commentators have made the same point.139 But 
plaintiffs must properly plead140 and courts must properly apply the new 
standard. Otherwise, employees will be required to meet the standard set 
forth in Sutton—a standard explicitly rejected by Congress. This needs to 
change. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has obvious implications for employment discrimination 
law. Aspects of the holdings in Sutton and Toyota—most notably the now 
superseded language from Sutton concerning the standard for “regarded as” 
 
 135.  Id. at 835–36 (quoting Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 
2001)). 
 136.  Id. at 836.  
 137.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) (2012). 
 138.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (2013) (“Where an individual is not challenging a 
covered entity’s failure to make reasonable accommodations and does not require a 
reasonable accommodation, it is generally unnecessary to proceed under the ‘actual 
disability’ or ‘record of’ prongs, which require a showing of an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity or a record of such an impairment. In these cases, 
the evaluation of coverage can be made solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the 
definition of disability, which does not require a showing of an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity or a record of such an impairment.”). 
 139.  See generally, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 103, 11–13 (2013); Michelle A. Travis, 
The Part and Parcel of Impairment Discrimination, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 35 
(2013); Michelle A. Travis, Impairment As a Protected Status: A New Universality for 
Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937 (2012).  
 140.  See Barry et al., supra note 103, at 58 (surveying early cases filed under the 
ADAAA and finding that “a staggering 62.50% of complaints alleging a non-
accommodation claim failed to raise [a ‘regarded as’ claim]”).  
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claims—live on as shadow precedents. Lawyers and judges should be vigilant 
in ensuring that the definition of disability that Congress enacted is properly 
applied in all cases. 
The broader implications of these findings reach beyond employment 
discrimination law. Our Constitutional structure vests all law-making 
authority in Congress, and overrides are expected to play a key role in 
maintaining legislative supremacy.141 They are the means by which Congress 
responds to judicial interpretations of statutes with which it disagrees, as well 
as a mechanism for updating or clarifying statutory law.142 Lawyers and 
courts therefore need to carefully assess statutory language, rather than 
reflexively relying on judicial precedents that interpret that language. They 
need to consider whether amendments to that statutory language affect the 
ongoing viability of prior precedent, including lower court decisions that rely 
on superseded Supreme Court decisions. In enacting the ADAAA, 
Congress repudiated the Supreme Court’s unduly stingy understanding of 
disability. Congress spoke clearly; courts now need to listen. 
 
 
 141.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All Legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”). 
 142.  See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 5, at 518–23 (discussing the role of 
overrides as checks on judicial statutory interpretation). 
